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Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism
In 1881 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., published The Common Law,
a revision of a series of lectures he had given at the Lowell Institute
in Boston in November and December of 1880.1 In The Common
Law Holmes aimed at providing a "general view" of the common
law, a coherent account of criminal and civil liability.2 The central
theme of Holmes's theory is that the common law has come to impose
liability without regard to the personal moral culpability of the of-
fender.
3
The Common Law changed the shape of American law.4 Professor
Grant Gilmore has written that Holmes was not "in the least" interest-
ed in describing the common law accurately; Holmes's doctrines were
revolutionary, and "[w]hat Holmes told the young lawyers who flocked
to his lectures ... promptly became the truth-the indisputable truth-
of the matter for his own and succeeding generations."5 Holmes him-
self, writing about The Common Law 27 years after its publication
recognized that "the theories and points of view that were new in
it, now have become familiar to the masters and even to the middle-
men and distributors of ideas-writers of textbooks and practical
works . . "I Holmes's emphasis on experience rather than logic, his
insistence that law is constantly changing, not static, and his arrange-
ment of the law into crime, tort, and contract has had an important
impact on American law.7
Holmes's ideas in The Common Law are generally recognized to
have been a confluence of his own massive learning,8 Nicholas St.John
1. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (M. Howe ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
HOLMES]. For a description of Holmes's lecture series at the Lowell Institute, see 2 M.
HOWE, JusTIc E OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs: THE PROVING YEARS 136 nn.2-3 (1963) [herein-
after cited as 2 HowE]. The Common Law is Holmes's only systematic exposition of his
legal theory; aside from several legal articles, e.g., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1894), reprinted in O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 117 (1920) [here-
inafter cited as COLLECTED PAPERS]. Holmes's writing after 1881 was confined to judicial
opinions, commencement addresses, and personal correspondence. See, e.g., On Receiving
The Degree of Doctor of Laws, in COLLECTED PAPERS, supra, at 33; HOLMsES-LAsKI LETTERS
(M. Howe ed. 1953).
2. HOLMES 5.
3. See Howe, Introduction to HOLMES at xxi.
4. 2 HowE, supra note 1, at 245-47.
5. G. GILs ORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 21 (1974).
6. Quoted in Howe, supra note 3, at xi.
7. Holmes was perhaps the first jurist to devise theories of tort and contract as distinct
fields of law. G. Gilmore, supra note 5, at 5-14. Holmes's earliest legal articles deal with
the division of the law into the proper categories. Holmes, The Arrangement of the Law
-Privity, 7 AM. L. Rav. 46 (1872); Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5
AM. L. REV. 1 (1870). See 2 HOWE, supra note 1, at 61-95.
8. See 2 HowE, supra note 1, at 135-95; Howe, O.W. Holmes, Jr.-Counsellor-at-Law,
in BRANDEIS LAWYER'S Soc'Y Pun. No. 10 (1948).
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Green's legal writingsu and Chauncey Wright's philosophy. 10 Yet there
are striking logical parallels between The Common Law and the
philosophy of Charles Peirce," the eminent American philosopher and
acquaintance of Holmes in the 1860's and 1870's, that have gone un-
recognized.' 2 These logical parallels are important for understanding
Holmes's legal pragmatism and hence important for understanding
our legal history.
Holmes is often called a legal pragmatist on the basis of his "pre-
diction theory" and his emphasis on experience in the evolution of
law.' 3 Yet the thread of his pragmatism runs much deeper, and recog-
nition of the pragmatic elements of his legal theory is vital for an
9. Nicholas St. John Green (1835-1868), American lawyer and friend of Holmes. Green's
obscurity is due probably to his early death, because his published works are exception-
ally prescient, though few in number. N. GREEN, ESSAYS ON TORT AND CRIME (1933). For
a description of Green's legal thought, see P. WIENER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF
PRAGMATISM 152-71 (1949). Jerome Frank has argued that Green influenced Holmes's
most distinctive legal contributions. Frank, A Conflict With Oblivion: Some Observations
on the Founders of Legal Pragmatism, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 425 (1954).
10. Chauncey Wright (1830-1875), American philosopher and friend of Holmes. For a
description of Wright's philosophy, see P. WIENER, supra note 9, at 31-70. In 1923 Holmes
wrote Morris Cohen, "That we could not assert necessity of the order of the universe I
learned to believe from Chauncey Wright long ago." HOLMES-COHEN CORRESPONDENCE,
34-35 (F. Cohen ed. 1948) (letter of Sept. 14, 1923).
11. Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), American philosopher. Son of Benjamin Peirce,
one of America's foremost mathematicians, Peirce has exercised enormous influence on
20th century philosophy. Most of Peirce's adult life was spent with the U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Survey, for whom he published his only book to appear in his lifetime, PHOTO-
METRIC RESEARCHES (1878). The book won Peirce international recognition among astro-
physicists. Peirce taught at Harvard and Johns Hopkins for a total of eight years, but his
eccentric personality made formal academic life impossible for him. His last 30 years
were spent in penurious seclusion in Milford, Pennsylvania. See Young, Charles Sanders
Peirce 1839-1914, in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 271 (P. Wiener
& F. Young eds. 1952); Weiss, Biography of Charles S. Peirce, in PERSPECTIVES ON PEIRCE I
(R. Bernstein ed. 1965). For Peirce's influence on the British logicians F.P. Ramsey and
Lord Russell and on the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, see H. THAYER,
MEANING AND ACTION 304-13 (1968). Arthur 0. Lovejoy, the intellectual historian, has said:
Peirce seems to me to have been the most original and perhaps the most seminal
mind among American philosophers of the nineteenth century, and he had, probably,
the widest range, "went into" the greatest number of philosophical fields and prob-
lems, though often more suggestively than thoroughly.
Quoted in Young, supra, at 274-75. The most useful summary of Peirce's philosophy is
W. GALLIE, PEIRCE AND PRAGMATISM (1952). ("Peirce" is inexplicably pronounced "purse."
See AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 967 (1969).)
12. Mark DeWolfe Howe and H.S. Thayer agree that there is little or no direct con-
nection between Holmes's legal theory and Peirce's philosophy. 2 HowE, supra note 1, at
75; H. THAYER, supra note 11, at viii. Max Fisch thinks Holmes's general outlook was
much closer to Peirce's than to William James's, but finds the similarities in Holmes's
"prediction theory" of law. Fisch, Justice Holmes, The Prediction Theory of Law, and
Pragmatism, 39 J. PHIL. 85 (1942). Philip Wiener also sees Holmes's pragmatism ex-
pressed mainly in the prediction theory. P. WIENER, supra note 9, at 172-89.
The prediction theory is not developed in The Common Law; on the prediction theory,
see Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in COLLECTED
PAPERS, supra note 1, at 167. Other articles describing Holmes's pragmatism do so in only
general terms. See, e.g., Brody, The Pragmatic Naturalism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 46
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 9 (1969); Gregg, The Pragmatism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 31 GEo. L.J.
262 (1943).
13. See note 12 supra.
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understanding of The Common Law. Holmes is a legal pragmatist
because he treats rules and standards as necessarily communal and
objective, and because he describes the legislative function performed
by the community in determining and applying law. These notions
are fundamentally Peircian.
Holmes and Peirce were members of a small "Metaphysical Club"
that met in Boston and Cambridge between 1870 and 1874.14 Other
members included William James, Chauncey Wright, and Nicholas
St. John Green. 15 The first mention of this Club is in an 1868 letter
from James to Holmes: "When I get home let's establish a philosoph-
ical society to have regular meetings and discuss none but the very
tallest and broadest questions-to be composed of none but the very
topmost cream of Boston manhood."' In 1907 Peirce wrote:
It was in the earliest seventies that a knot of us young men
in Old Cambridge, calling ourselves, half-ironically, half-defiant-
ly, "The Metaphysical Club," . . . used to meet, sometimes in
my study, sometimes in that of William James. It may be that
some of our old-time confederates would today not care to have
such wild-oats-sowing made public . . . . Mr. Justice Holmes,
however, will not, I believe, take it ill that we are proud to re-
member his membership .... [L]est the club should be dissolved,
without leaving any material souvenir behind, I drew up a little
paper expressing some of the opinions that I had been urging all
along under the name of pragmatism. 17
Peirce's souvenir, read to the Metaphysical Club in November 1872,18
became the celebrated articles, "The Fixation of Belief" and "How
To Make Our Ideas Clear."' 9 Thus Holmes and Peirce may have in-
fluenced each other's thought in the early 1870's.20
14. 5 C. PEIRCE, COLLECTED PAPERS fr 5.12 (C. Hartshorne 8. P. Weiss eds. 1960) [herein-
after cited as PEIRCE]. For further descriptions of the Metaphysical Club, see P. WIENER,
supra note 9, at 18-30; Fisch, Was There a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge?, in STUDIES
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, SECOND SERIES 3 (E. Moore ed. 1964).
15. Fisch, supra note 14.
16. Quoted in Fisch, supra note 14, at 4.
17. PEIRCE . 5.12-.13.
18. Fisch, supra note 14, at 6.
19. PEIRCE ffff 5.358-A10. These articles were originally published in the November
1877 and January 1878 issues, respectively, of the Popular Science Monthly.
20. In 1920 Holmes wrote to Morris Cohen that he had not heard of pragmatism as
late as 1891. HOLMES-COHEN CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 10, at 19 (letter of July 21,
1920). In 1927 Holmes wrote to an editor of Peirce's papers, Charles Hartshorne, "I think
I learned more from Chauncey Wright and St. John Green, as I saw Peirce very little."
Quoted in Fisch, Alexander Bain and the Genealogy of Pragmatism, 15 J. HIST. OF IDEAS
413, 414 n.6 (1954). There is no record that Holmes read any of Peirce's articles until
1923 when he read the collection entitled Chance, Love and Logic. See HOLMES-COHEN
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 10, at 34 (letter of Sept. 14, 1923). Certainly Holmes and
Peirce would not have been attracted to each other as young men: Holmes was a proper
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Philip Wiener has said of the Metaphysical Club: "There is scarcely
any basic problem in the natural and social sciences to which this
group did not make some important contribution to our thinking."2 1
Holmes and Peirce as members of the Metaphysical Club were part
of a conceptual revolution in American thought that rejected indi-
vidualism and shifted toward collectivism in epistemology, science, and
law. In The Common Law this revolution was expressed as an attack
on a conception of legal rules as private, internal, and subjective.
In Peirce's early philosophy this revolution was expressed as an at-
tack on the epistemology of Rene Descartes, the 17th century French
philosopher.
This conceptual revolution provides the intellectual setting for an
examination of three fundamental parallels between The Common
Law and Peirce's early philosophy: first, the attack on private and
internal standards; second, the insistence that objective standards can
only result from intersubjective agreement among members of a com-
munity; and finally, the postulation that the processes of inquiry and
adjudication will continue indefinitely.
I. External Standards in Holmes and Peirce
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Holmes's biographer, has described Holmes's
intellectual aims in the years before he wrote The Common Law:
In 1872 he [Holmes] was not, I think, seriously searching for
a jurisprudence consistent with the philosophical premises of his
generation. He was neither considering the nature of truth nor
twisting the tail of the cosmos. He was engaged in the more
limited and quite hard-headed task of examining the validity of
Austin's thesis that law is always identifiable as the command of
the sovereign.
22
The result of Holmes's task was in fact a theory of law opposed to
Austin's. For Austin the will of the sovereign is utterly unbounded;
the sovereign issues commands in accordance with standards that are
Bostonian, a Civil War hero, while Peirce was a young genius, as difficult to get along
with as a "snarl of twine." Still, it is clear that Holmes's general outlook closely resembled
Peirce's. See Fisch, supra note 12, at 96 n.27. Fisch suggests Holmes lost touch with
Peirce and came to associate "pragmatism" with the philosophy of William James. Id. at
96. Together with Holmes's general reluctance to acknowledge intellectual indebtedness,
see 2 HowE, supra note 1, at 71-72, 84, this may account for Holmes's neglect of Peirce in
later years.
21. P. WIENER, supra note 9, at v.
22. 2 HoWE, supra note 1, at 75. See generally J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURIs-
PRUDENCE DETERMINED (1954).
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personal and independent of the will of any other individual. Al-
though the sovereign may defer to the wishes of his subjects, he need
not. The sovereign's legislation is judged only by the sovereign's stand-
ards. The Common Law, on the other hand, takes the "felt necessities
of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious"2 3 to be the standards by which
every law is determined. These standards are communal and objective.
Standards that are, by contrast, personal and subjective, such as those
of an Austinian sovereign, Holmes calls "moral."
Throughout The Common Law Holmes reiterates the opposition
of internal, moral standards of conduct and external, objective stand-
ards of conduct:
[W]hile the terminology of morals is still retained, and while
the law does still and always, in a certain sense, measure legal lia-
bility by moral standards, it nevertheless, by the very necessity
of its nature, is continually transmuting those moral standards
into external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the
party concerned is wholly eliminated. 24
Here and elsewhere Holmes identifies "internal" with "moral," and
"external" with "objective." 25 Thus internal standards, for Holmes, are
psychological and subjective, and they grade the personal moral cul-
pability of a particular individual. External standards are public and
grade the conduct of the members of the community generally.
Holmes's insistence that legal rules are external implies that legal
terms such as "intent" and "malice" require public criteria for their
application. Legal liability, for Holmes, can only be imposed by rules
that are shared by members of the community. Moral blame, on the
other hand, can be ascribed to a person by applying rules that are
private and internal; that is, in Holmes's view moral terms such as
"blameworthy" and "actual guilt" do not require public, shared cri-
teria for their application. The law may often appropriate a subjective
moral term, but once appropriated, the moral term loses its private
standards of application and comes to be applied by public, shared
standards: "[T]he tendency of the law everywhere is to transcend
moral and reach external standards .... 26
Holmes's theory of external legal standards is illustrated in his treat-
23. HOLMES 5.
24. Id. at 33.
25. See id. at 43: "TJhe tests of liability are external, and independent of the degree
of evil in the particular person's motives or intentions." See id. at 7-8, 35, 41-42, 88.
26. Id. at 107-08.
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ment of the element of malice in the crime of murder.27 Holmes notes
that malice, as used in common speech, is a word of moral condem-
nation. When a person is said to act maliciously, it is commonly meant
both that the person acts intentionally, and that the person wishes to
cause harm or suffering for its own sake. Between these two parts
of malice, only intent is relevant to the crime of murder; one may
murder another, according to Holmes, and yet be sorry that the other
suffers and dies. The legal use of malice thus lacks moral connota-
tions: "Malice, in the definition of murder, has not the same meaning
as in common speech, and, in view of the considerations just men-
tioned, it has been thought to mean criminal intention." 28
With malice thus reduced to criminal intent, Holmes suggests that
criminal intent requires two elements: first, foresight that particular
results will flow from a particular act, and second, desire that the
results foreseen shall occur.2 9 Holmes shows that, in fact, the second
element is superfluous:
For instance, a newly born child is laid naked out of doors,
where it must perish as a matter of course. This is none the less
murder, that the guilty party would have been very glad to have
a stranger find the child and save it.30
Thus foresight that death will result from a particular act is enough
to constitute criminal intent in murder, whether or not the guilty
party desired the death.
A person is guilty of murder if he acts so as to kill another in a
situation where such a result is likely to occur, whether or not he
actually foresaw that the death of another would result from his
actions: "The test of foresight is not what this very criminal foresaw,
but what a man of reasonable prudence would have foreseen." 3x Al-
though to have legal intent a person must know the circumstances
making a particular action dangerous to life, persons are held to
reasonable prudence in discovering such circumstances. 32
The example given by Holmes is of a workman on a housetop throw-
ing a beam down to the ground.33 If the workman knows there to be
27. Holmes uses Sir James Stephen's definition of murder as unlawful homicide with
malice aforethought. Id. at 43-44.
28. Id. at 45.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Thus Holmes rejects mens rea. See id. at 61: "[T]he mens rea, or actual wicked-
ness of the party, is wholly unnecessary." Holmes has not, however, adopted strict liability
for murder, because the element of intent is still central to his account. See Allen,
Criminal Law, 31 U. CM. L. Rav. 257, 260 (1964).
32. HOLMES 46.
33. Id. at 47.
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a busy street below, he must understand at his peril that to drop the
beam will likely cause serious injury or death. If he does drop the
beam and kills a passerby, he is charged with murder, regardless of
whether he in fact understood the consequences of his dropping the
beam. If the workman knows the space below to be a dump-heap shut
off from intruders, a death caused by a beam dropped by the workman
is not murder. Whether a death so caused is murder, manslaughter,
or mere misadventure is determined by the foreseeable risk to passers-
by from the falling beam.
3'
An intentional killing may be reduced from murder to manslaughter
if the defendant acted after sufficient provocation. According to
Holmes this is not because the provocation left the crime in effect
unintentional. In these situations, the defendant is unable to control
himself and is beyond the influence of threatened punishment; to the
extent the defendant cannot control himself his actual mental con-
stitution at the time of the crime is taken into account by the law.
Yet the circumstances in which persons are excused because the law's
threats carry no force are determined largely by objective standards.
The sufficiency of provocation has been decided by such tests as the
length of time between provocation and killing, and the nature of
the weapon used to kill.35
On Holmes's account the element of malice in the crime of murder
is reduced first to intent and then to knowledge of circumstances mak-
ing a particular act dangerous to human life. The moral connotation
of malice is drained off and what remains is the objective element of
knowledge of certain circumstances. The inferences to be drawn from
this knowledge are those common experience has shown to be war-
ranted, and these inferences are presumed to have been drawn. Ex-
cept in exceptional cases a failure to foresee the consequences of an
action is no defense.
Holmes applies his theory of external legal standards across the
entire sweep of The Common Law. Holmes's attempt to bring the
bases of legal liability into a "philosophically continuous series"36 rests
on the attack, implicit throughout The Common Law, on the notion
that private, internal standards can serve as a basis of legal liability.
Howe explains Holmes's theory of external standards as an attempt
to increase the certainty and predictability of the law, because ex-
34. Id.
35. See id. at 51: "At the same time the objective nature of legal standards is shown
even here .... There must be provocation sufficient to justify the passion, and the law
decides on general considerations what provocations are sufficient."
36. Id. at 104.
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ternal, public standards can be applied in a precise and regular fash-
ion.3 ' This is accurate, but it is important to recognize that the crux
of Holmes's theory is that private, internal standards cannot be ap-
plied in precise and regular fashion.38 Holmes saw that only external,
public standards can function as standards at all.
Holmes's recognition that only public standards can function as
legal rules is paralleled in Charles Peirce's attack on the epistemology
of Rene Descartes. 39 In two articles published in 1868, "Concerning
Certain Faculties Claimed For Man,"'40 and "Some Consequences of
Four Incapacities, 14  Peirce argued that the Cartesian use of the in-
dividual consciousness as the ultimate criterion of truth and falsehood
is wrong in principle. Descartes held that the individual's clear and
distinct intuition is the surest gauge of truth. Peirce says that this
amounts to asserting that "[w]hatever I am clearly convinced of, is
true."42 He goes on: "[T]hus to make single individuals absolute
judges of truth is most pernicious."43 Peirce in fact denies that persons
have a power of introspection that gives direct knowledge of the con-
tents of consciousness; rather, "all knowledge of the internal world is
derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external
facts."
44
Peirce's substitute for the Cartesian clear and distinct idea is the
agreement of a community of inquirers:
In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory
has been broached it is considered to be on probation until this
agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question of cer-
tainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who
doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the
ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, there-
37. 2 HOWE, supra note 1, at 197. Francis Allen rejects Howe's explanation. Allen,
supra note 31, at 261.
38. Holmes's arguments in The Common Law are structured such that this negative
thesis, that private rules are incapable of precise, regular application, is never explicitly
made. Holmes expends great effort showing that external legal standards can account
for the law's use of psychological terms such as "intent" and "malice," and his arguments
to this end imply that internal standards cannot account for the law's use of these
terms. Holmes gives no other reason for rejecting internal standards. It is important that
Holmes is examining the bases of liability at common law, and not merely the evidentiary
advantages of legal rules that deal purely with conduct. See HOLMES 105 (discussion of
intent). Although The Common Law is cast in historical form, Holmes's arguments for
his theory of external legal standards are logical and not historical. See 2 HowE, supra
note 1, at 161-62.
'39. For a description of Descartes's philosophy, see A. KENNY, DEscARTES (1968).
40. PEIRCE f" 5.213, originally published in 2 J. SPECULATIVE PHIL. 103 (1868).
41. PEIRCE IT 5.264, originally published in 2 J. SPECULATIVE PHIL. 140 (1868).
42. PEIRCE IT 5.265.
43. Id.
44. Id. ff 5.265. For Peirce's arguments against introspection, see id. I[ff 5.244-.249.
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fore, for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined
and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to ac-
cept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of
the theory himself.
45
Descartes's paradigm of knowledge was geometry; Peirce's paradigm
was the experimental or laboratory sciences. 46 Peirce sought to replace
Descartes's reliance on the "natural light" of immediate intuition of
clear and distinct ideas with the process of a community of inquirers
reaching agreement through application of public and accepted meth-
ods of research. The community of inquirers following scientific meth-
od is defined, as Professor John Smith has said, "by the willingness of
each individual member to sacrifice what is personal and private to
him alone in order to follow the dictates of an interpersonal method
that involves free exchange of views and results.
'4 7
In his 1878 article, "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," Peirce first
formulated his celebrated "pragmatic maxim":
[C]onsider what effects, that might conceivably have practical
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then,
our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of
the object.
48
This maxim was designed to achieve the third degree of clarity in our
ideas, after the degrees of familiarity and definition.49 It carries two
significant implications: first, it implies that the meaning of words
(or of ideas) is given in sets of rules that are public and communal;
second, it implies that meaning is dependent upon possible future
45. Id. ff 5.265 (Peirce's emphasis).
46. Holmes shared Peirce's paradigm. For Holmes's assertion that science was "at the
bottom" of the gap between Holmes and his father, see HOLMES-COHEN CORRESPONDENCE,
supra note 10, at 14 (letter of Feb. 5, 1919).
Howe offers this description of Holmes's reading as a law student and young practi-
tioner:
Suffice it to say that Holmes's readings outside the law clearly indicate his absorp-
tion in the philosophical problems of the time. In the broadest sense those problems
turned upon the central impact of science upon belief-upon the question whether
the positivist methods of science were to displace the metaphysical methods of the
philosophers.
Howe, supra note 8, at 7. But cf. 2 HOWE, supra note 1, at 75.
47. J. SMITH, THEMES IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 98 (1970).
48. PEIRCE jf 5A02. This maxim has any number of other formulations in Peirce's
philosophy, e.g., "[if one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phe-
nomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein
a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing else in it." Id. ff
5.412 (Peirce's emphasis). For discussions of Peirce's maxim, see H. THAYER, supra note
1I, at 85-86; C. IORRIS, THE PRAGMATIC MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 20-23 (1970).
49. Peirce says the maxim leads to "more perfect clearness of thought, such as we see
and admire in the thinkers of our own time." PEIRCE f 5.390.
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events, and therefore that the meaning of a word is conditional upon
the shape of future events.
The public nature of meaning analyzed with the pragmatic maxim
may be illustrated by an example used by Peirce, that of the word
"hard." 0 By calling a thing hard it is meant, according to Peirce,
that the thing can be scratched by only a few materials. The meaning
of "The steel plate is hard" is a rule that the steel plate will not be
scratched if rubbed with wood, or cork, or most plastics, etc.
Peirce's example will also serve to illustrate the second implication
of the pragmatic theory of meaning. If "hard" means "If rubbed with
wood (or cork, or plastic), this material will not be scratched," then
the meaning of "hard" is contained in a rule telling us what to ex-
pect in the future from certain actions. Told that a lump of quartz
is hard, we will not expect it to be scratched by wood or cork; given
the meaning of a word, we may predict the outcome of our operations
on the object to which the word is applied.
Peirce says, "Man is so completely hemmed in by the bounds of
his possible practical experience ... that he cannot, in the least, mean
anything that transcends those limits."51 In other words, it is not pos-
sible to make meaningful assertions that do not have at least a pos-
sible practical bearing on our future conduct; a conception to be
meaningful must have practical consequences of some kind. This shows
why Peirce held that rules must be public and communal: Given that
we lack a power of introspection, the limits of the. shared world are
the limits of our practical experience. Private rules, known through
introspection, are impossible; the only meaningful rules are public
and communal.
Holmes and Peirce both contrasted public, external rules with pri-
vate, internal rules. For Holmes, external standards govern imposition
of liability in crime, tort, and contract. For Peirce, external rules
govern the search for truth and the meaning of words. Holmes's at-
tack on legal standards that are private and internal is simply another
version of Peirce's attack on the Cartesian clear and distinct idea as
a criterion of truth. When Holmes demands that legal standards be
public and external, he is responding to the same philosophical im-
pulse that led Peirce to say that all knowledge of our psychological
states is derived from observation of public facts.
Holmes's theory of external legal standards is ambivalent on the
relation of law to morality. Giving moral standards only private ap-
50. Id. fr 5.403.
51. Id. ff 5.536. See id. ff 5A12.
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plication while giving legal standards only public application makes
moral standards and legal standards mutually exclusive. Despite this,
Holmes wants to "measure" legal liability by moral standards "in a
certain sense." He also wants moral standards "transcended" or "trans-
muted" into external (and hence nonmoral) standards.5 2 Nowhere in
The Common Law does Holmes describe the "certain sense" in which
law and morals are related, and he leaves the manner in which morals
are "transmuted" obscure. Holmes separates legal standards and moral
standards in a way that makes any relationship between the two im-
possible, and thus his attempts to explain their relation are inadequate
and unclear.
Holmes could have avoided this ambivalence had he carried his
attack on private standards to its logical conclusion, as Peirce carried
his attack on Descartes. The philosophical impulse that pushed Holmes
to demand that legal standards be public and external was a recogni-
tion, implicit throughout The Common Law, that it is impossible to
give a coherent account of a legal standard that is private to an in-
dividual, and not part of the public, shared world.5 3 Yet Holmes's
analysis of legal rules should apply as well to moral rules: both the
rules by which we impose legal liability and the rules by which we
impose moral blame must be part of the public, shared world. In
attacking Descartes, Peirce showed that any rule-moral, legal, or scien-
tific-must be communal to be meaningful.
If Holmes had followed Peirce and treated both moral standards
and legal standards as external and public, then his ambivalence could
have been resolved. Holmes may have feared that to grant moral stand-
ards the same status as legal standards would have forced an assimila-
tion of law and morality, but this fear is groundless: legal standards
and moral standards may both be external without implying that legal
rules must impose liability only on the basis of moral culpability.54
Allowing legal standards and moral standards to be external would
have made intelligible Holmes's claim that the two are related:
"[C]riminal liability, as well as civil, is founded on blameworthiness.
:.. [A] law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy
in the average member of the community would be too severe for that
community to bear."' 5
52. See p. 1127 supra.
53. See note 38 supra; L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 153 (1953): "An
'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria."
54. See L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QuEsr OF ITSELF 5 (1940). For Howe's defense of
Holmes against Fuller's charge of positivism, see Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice
Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REv. 529 (1951).
55. HOLmES 42.
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Holmes's failure to resolve this ambivalence caused him to give a
fundamentally impoverished account of law. 56 Holmes asserts in a
famous passage that the "first requirement" of a sound body of law
is that it reflect the needs and desires of the community, whether
right or wrong.57 Perhaps this is true, but certainly the second re-
quirement is that law be fair and just. Holmes never requires fairness
and justice of law because he cannot describe the relation of these
moral notions to his "objective" legal rules. Had Holmes not drawn
the line between law and morality where he did, his account of law
would have been less stark, and it would have encompassed the moral
demands we make of law.
II. The Community as Arbiter of Standards
in Holmes and Peirce
The second fundamental parallel between The Common Law and
Peirce's early philosophy is the recognition that the community is
the important arbiter of standards. Their rejection of internal stand-
ards flows from a desire for objectivity, and both understood that
objectivity could only result from agreement among members of a
community. In Peirce's case the relevant community is composed of
scientific inquirers: in Holmes's it is the group of citizens subject
to law.58
The role of the community in Holmes's theory is shown most clearly
in his treatment of the jury in negligence cases.59 The jury's function,
according to Holmes, is to find a rule of conduct based on practical
experience:
[A]s the teachings of experience are matters of fact, it is easy to
see why the jury should be consulted with regard to them. They
are, however, facts of special and peculiar function . . . . Their
function is to suggest a rule of conduct. 60
56. See Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. Ci. L. REV. 213, 225 (1964).
57. HOLMES 36.
58. Strictly, in Holmes's case the relevant community is that of judges and jurors,
since together they formulate and apply law. The citizens subject to law possess a veto
over laws that are too harsh.
59. Id. at 97-103. Jerome Frank argues that Holmes's account of the jury was taken
"unconsciously" from Green's essay, Proximate Cause and Remote Cause, reprinted in
N. GREEN, supra note 9, at 1. See Frank, supra note 9, at 434-37. While Green certainly
influenced Holmes, Green's essay presents a purely legal analysis of the jury's function in
negligence cases. Frank does not explain the origin of the remarkable ideas that sug-
gested this account of the jury's function. Compare Green, Slander and Libel, in N.
GREEN, supra note 9, at 49, with HoLmEs 110-12.
60. HOLMES 119-20.
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The judge, an individual, can formulate rules of conduct, but unless
guided by the jury, he cannot correct mistaken rules.6' Holmes says,
"The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should cor-
respond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, wheth-
er right or wrong." 62 The individual judge might lay down a just
rule of conduct that for Holmes would be unsound because it failed
to reflect the desires of the community.
Holmes notes that the question of negligence has two parts: first,
that the defendant has done or failed to do certain acts; and second,
that his conduct does not meet the legal standard of care.63 The first
part will always be the responsibility of the jury. The second part
will fall to either the court or the jury depending on whether the
court feels competent to lay down a rule of liability without con-
sulting the jury's practical experience. Even in cases where the court
presently feels incompetent, it eventually should begin to articulate
and apply a rule by itself, at least in situations that repeatedly present
themselves:
Either the court will find the fair teaching of experience is that
the conduct complained of usually is or is not blameworthy, and
therefore, unless explained, is or is not a ground of liability; or it
will find the jury oscillating to and fro, and will see the necessity
of making up its mind for itself.64
Over an indefinite period of time the court's practical knowledge
should expand to the point where it is no longer necessary to consult
the jury when selecting a rule of liability.
Peirce gives an account of scientific inquiry that is logically parallel
to Holmes's account of the jury's function. For Peirce, if we desire
a certain result from our actions, it is necessary to act according to
rules that enable us to predict the results of particular acts. Peirce
calls these rules of conduct "habits,"65 and equates them with be-
liefs: "The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of
61. See id. at 98: "IT]he court... feels that it is not itself possessed of sufficient
practical experience to lay down the rule intelligently. It conceives that twelve men
taken from the practical part of the community can aid its judgment."
62. Id. at 36.
63. Id. at 97.
64. Id. at 98. See id. at 99: "A judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought gradually to
acquire a fund of experience which enables him to represent the common sense of the
community in ordinary instances far better than an average jury .... Furthermore, the
sphere in which he is able to rule without taking their opinion at all should be con-
tinually growing."
65. Peirce no doubt took his use of "habit" from the scholastic philosophers, who
used it to denote dispositions to act in particular ways. See Fisch, supra note 20, at 420
n.29.
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there being established in our nature some habit which will determine
our actions."0 6 Peirce thought that everyone of necessity relies on a
wide range of habits in day-to-day life.
Inquiry begins when a previously accepted habit fails in a specific
instance to produce the expected results. This failure causes the validity
of the habit to be doubted, and the doubt cannot be dispelled until
belief in a new habit is established. Doubt is an "uneasy and dis-
satisfied state" that drives us to conduct inquiry into the ability of
possible new habits to predict accurately the outcome of particular
acts.67 Peirce holds that the "sole object of inquiry is the settlement
of opinion." 68 It is not the case that inquiry seeks truth; it seeks only
firm belief, because once belief in a habit is firmly held the habit
is no longer questioned. 69
In "The Fixation of Belief" Peirce discusses several methods of
settling opinion, but he argues that the only adequate method is that
of science. The advantage of scientific method is that it is self-cor-
rective: The hypotheses we draw from observations will ultimately
be free of error, according to Peirce. Yet given that inquiry seeks
only firm belief, it is difficult to understand why the result of scien-
tific inquiry is the ultimate correction of all error. Peirce explains
that, while the individual seeks only firm belief, the result of the
community's inquiry, carried out over an indefinitely long period, is
the correction of all error:
All that we can know or conceive of the existence of real things
is involved in two premises: First, that investigation will ultimate-
ly lead to a settled opinion, and, second, that this opinion is en-
tirely determined by observations. The only thing that we can
infer is that the observations have such a character that they are
fated to lead ultimately to one conclusion."
66. PEIRCE f 5.371.
67. Id. jf 5.372. This "doubt/belief" theory of inquiry was derived from the writings
of the Scottish psychologist, Alexander Bain. Like Peirce, Bain discusses beliefs as dis-
positions to act in certain ways. The members of the Metaphysical Club were all familiar
with Bain's work; Holmes cites Bain's Mental and Moral Science in the first chapter of
The Common Law. HOLMES 13 n.25. See Fisch, supra note 20 (a discussion of Bain's in-
fluence on pragmatism).
Holmes met Bain in London in 1866 and remarked in his diary that while Bain had
an impressive knowledge of fact, he lacked the "infinite perspective of metaphysics."
Quoted in P. WIENER, supra note 9, at 269 n.16.
68. PEIRCE rl 5.375. He continues: "We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and
that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But put this fancy to the test,
and it proves groundless; for as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied,
whether the belief be true or false." Id.
69. Peirce's view of this matter is complex and he modified his position over a period
of years. See Bronstein, Inquiry and Meaning, in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE, supra note 11, at 33.
70. Quoted in M. MURPHEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY 166 (1961).
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This ultimate conclusion would be the truth. Thus, Peirce tries to
define truth in terms of inquiry, and inquiry in terms of doubt and
belief.
The community plays a similar role in Holmes's account of the
jury's function and in Peirce's theory of scientific inquiry. Just as
Peirce ties together truth and the firm beliefs of the community,
Holmes identifies the soundness of a law with its relation to the
desires of the community. In both accounts, the community serves to
correct the errors of individuals.
III. The Indefinite Continuation of
Adjudication and Inquiry
The final parallel between The Common Law and Peirce's early
philosophy is that both postulate an indefinite continuation of the
processes they describe. In the opening lecture of The Common Law
Holmes says:
The truth is, that the law is always approaching, and never
reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles from
life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history at
the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off.
It will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.71
The law's consistency comes from the logical form of its development,
each decision following logically from precedent. The substance of
the law, however, is legislative, Holmes says. 72 When precedent in
negligence law calls for one rule, and changed circumstances cause
judges and juries to think only another rule fair to plaintiffs and
defendants, then precedent will be reasoned away.
The official theory is that each new decision follows syllogis-
tically from existing precedents. But just as the clavicle in the
cat only tells of the existence of some earlier creature to which
a collarbone was useful, precedents survive in the law long after
the use they once served is at an end and the reason for them
has been forgotten. The result of following them must often be
failure and confusion from the merely logical point of view.7 3
71. HOLMEs 32.
72. See id. at 5, 32.
73. Id. at 31. Grant Gilmore has described the "official theory" Holmes was reacting
against:
[L]aw was a symmetrical structure of logical propositions, all neatly dovetailed.
The truth or error, the rightness or wrongness, of a judicial decision could be
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The adoption of new rules, or new rationales for old rules, blocks
consistency in the law, even though consistency is demanded by legal
form; this is the "paradox of form and substance in the development
of the law."74 Holmes reconciles the demands of logic and legislation
by postulating an indefinite continuation of the legal process: the
law will constantly approach, and never reach, consistency.
Holmes's resolution of this paradox is logically similar to Peirce's
solution of the problem set by his assertion that scientific method
is self-corrective. Scientific method can be self-corrective only if some
changes in scientific theory are corrections rather than mere changes
in belief; yet this seems difficult if inquiry seeks only firm belief.
Peirce's distinction between the immediate goal of the individual
(firm belief) and the ultimate goal of the community (truth) avoids
the Cartesian conclusion that truth is whatever is believed, but it
presents Peirce with the need to explain why the ultimate belief
shared by the community is truth.75
Peirce's explanation is that scientific method is "fated" to lead
ultimately to a single true opinion. Peirce says he does not mean
anything superstitious or occult by "fate," only that which is certain
to happen, as in "We are all fated to die."' G Peirce has two reasons
for concluding that scientific inquiry is destined ultimately to lead
to the truth: first, the history of science reveals that persistent inquiry
into a problem eventually results in a stable community belief; second,
Peirce's metaphysic describes a universe evolving toward rationality
and order, which suggests that in the long run all scientific questions
will be answered.
77
Peirce's assertion that firm belief and scientific observations are
ultimately fated to coincide is less startling when taken in the context
of Peirce's expectation that scientific inquiry will never cease. Just
as Holmes avoids a clash between the logical and legislative sides of
the law by tolerating the "paradox" of inconsistency as a product of
determined by merely checking to see whether it fitted into the symmetrical struc-
ture; if it fitted, it was right; if it did not fit, it was wrong and could, or at least
should, be disregarded.
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Causes and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038 (1961).
74. HOLMEs 31.
75. See Bronstein, supra note 69, at 38.
76. Thayer has remarked that Peirce's use of "fate" "seems to attribute an occult
power to true opinions and a mysterious efficacy to truth." H. THAYER, supra note 11, at
125. See J. SMITH, supra note 47, at 99-102. Although Peirce did not always use "fate," his
statements invariably rely on similar conceptions: "Truth is that concordance of an
abstract statement with the ideal limit toward which endless investigation would tend
to bring scientific belief...." PEIRCE ff 5.565. (Peirce's style sometimes obscures his
thoughts rather than illuminating them.)
77. See J. SMITH, supra note 47, at 99-100.
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legal change, Peirce pushes his reliance on fate to one side by postu-
lating an indefinite continuation of scientific inquiry. Where Peirce
asserts the community will constantly approach truth, Holmes asserts
that the law will constantly approach consistency.
Conclusion
In his lecture on the criminal law, Holmes wrote:
[I]t seems to me clear that the ultima ratio, not only regum,
but of private persons is force, and that at the bottom of all
private relations, however tempered by sympathy and all the so-
cial feelings, is a justifiable self-preference.78
Howe notes that such "Darwinian premises" as expressed here by
Holmes usually led to political philosophies built around the rights
and powers of individuals. Howe goes on to say:
In Holmes's case, however, his recognition that the common
law had persistently worked its way toward objective standards
of liability brought with it . . . an acknowledgment that the
tendency if not the progress of civilization is toward the pref-
erence of social to private interests.79
Often Holmes did think (and decide, after he gained the bench) that
the needs of society have first claim on the individual.80 Yet consider
how extraordinarily against the grain of the late 19th century Holmes's
thought went. Not only did Darwinian and Spencerian premises place
the individual ahead of society, but jurisprudence and philosophy in-
variably focused on the individual.
Holmes's early efforts in jurisprudence were directed against John
Austin. Austin's description of the sovereign as completely inde-
pendent, with a will utterly unbounded is a description of a Cartesian
consciousness. The sovereign relies on private standards for giving his
commands to his subjects. Holmes's attack on Austin's theory is di-
rected at the notion that the sovereign's standards could be, even in
principle, private and internal. Holmes built his theory of legal stand-
ards on the idea that objectivity can be gained only through intersub-
jective agreement among members of a community.
78. HOLMES 38.
79. Howe, supra note 3, at xxvi.
80. See Lowry, Mr. Justice Holmes: The conmunity vs. The Individual, 36 CALIF. L.
REv. 390 (1948).
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Thus Holmes's preference of social over individual interests results
from his demand for objective legal standards, in much the same way
that Peirce's attack on Descartes led him to demand agreement among
a community of inquirers as a measure of truth. Just as Holmes ar-
gued that the sovereign is hemmed in by "considerations of what is
expedient for the community concerned,""' Peirce argued that the in-
dividual inquirer must sacrifice his private goals and standards to the
community's interpersonal scientific method. Both men shared the
central perception that individual standards are inherently subjective,
and that a community is necessary for objectivity.
Perhaps it is worth recalling that Holmes and Peirce were both
members of the Metaphysical Club where Peirce read his paper, "ex-
pressing some of the opinions that I had been urging all along under
the name of pragmatism.18 2 The fundamental parallels between The
Common Law and Peirce's early philosophy are striking, and they
suggest that Peirce may have been a more important direct influence
on Holmes than has been recognized or than Holmes admitted.83
81. HOLMES 32.
82. PEIRCE ff 5.12-.13.
83. See note 20 supra.
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